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Loayza develops a theoretical  model based on such  speeds up.
factor-cost asymmetry. He applies it to an urban  *  Policies with an urban bias hasten rural-urban
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I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.  INTRODUCFION
The formal sector is defined as the group of economic  units that comply  with regulations
and taxes.  By contrast, the informal  sector evades onerous regulations  but faces the
disadvantages  of working outside  the legal system.
The informal  economy, escaping  labor regulations, provides employment  to a
considerable  fraction  of the labor force in developing  countries. Tuirnham  (1993)  provides  some
estimates  of informal labor employment  for groups of countries  at different  stages of
development. These are presented in Table 1.  Informal  employment  declines  in importance  as
the general level of development  rises.  However, it remains large even in high-income
developing  countries, in which it employs 31% of the labor force.
The present paper develops a theoredcal-  model building over the asymmetry  in factor
costs evident  in countries  with informal  economies: Whereas  labor costs are higher in the formal
sector,  -for  the informal  sector capital is more expensive. Regulatons designed,  in theory, to
improve  workers' welfare appear in various forms, namely, minimum  wages,  -finge  benefits,
social security, constraints on free hiring and dismissal, and-protection.to  unions.  Formal finns,
because  of their compliance  with labor regulations, face higher labor costs. Portes, Castells,  and
Benton  (1989)  argue that "the best-known  economic  effect of the informalization  process is to
reduce the costs of labor substantially" (p. 30).  Tokman (1992) writes that for small firms in
Latin  America, labor regulations  augment  labor costs by an average of around 20 percent,  which
is about equally divided between benefits and social securiiy  contributions. Seturmnan (1981),
after reviewing  a series of studies in developing  nations, concludes  that the majority of  -informal-
sector workers receive wages below the legal mnimum.  The observed  wage dualism is not
-2-explained  by workers' skill differential  across the two sectors;  Fields (1990)  writes that  both
tabular presentations  and'multivariate  analysis  demonstrate,wage  differendals for observationally
equivalent labor'  (p. 51).-
On the other hand, capital is more expensive  to'informal producers.  Broadly  speaking,
this is due to capital market imperfections  which are exacerbated  by some  features of informal
finns, such as small size, low physical capital intensity,  and semi-illegality. As explained  below,
the present  paper abstracts  from issues regarding  firm's size of operation and derives low
informal  sector capital intensity  as a result of the model  We argue that informal  firms' seni-
illegal  status, brought about by their evasion of labor regulations,  worsens  capital market
imperfections  facing them.  Given.that  informal  activities  are partially illegal, entrepreneurs  can
not exercise full property rights over them;  therefore, contracts related to informal activities  can
not be properly enforced trough  the judicial system. The inability to sign fully enforceable
contac  creates uncertainty and increases  the transaction  and monitoring  costs in all business
dealings  conducted  by informal  finns.  This applies especially  to capital  and financial  markets.
In his study of the Peruvian informal  sector in 1985, De Soto (1989) reports that the average
nominal  borrowing  rate for infonnal firms was 22% monthly,  whereas for formal firms of
comparable  size, it was 4.9%.  Huq and Sultan (1991)  report that in Bangladesh  informal  firms
paid rates between 48 to 100  %.annually  for producidon  loans, whereas the borrowing  rate from
commercial  banks, for formal firms of similar characteristics,  was around 12%.'
The asymmnetry  in factor costs across formal and informal sectors provides the structure
of this paper.  We first analyze the static allocation  of production factors across the two sectors
that is consistent  with a decentralized,  full-employment  equilibrium  (Sections  lII.A and M.B).
We then develop  a dynamic  model in which the urban labor force grows through a rural-urban
-3-migration  process, a la Harris and Todaro (1970), and capital accumulates  according to an
optimal  program of savings and investment  (Section III.).
Section II briefly analyzes  the Latin American  context in which informal  economics  arose
in the post-Second  World War period.  Section IV offers some suggestions  for future research.
H.  THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT
In the post-Second  World War years, Latin America  experienced  a remarkable
demographic  transformation. From 1950 to 1990, the proportion of the total population  living in
urban areas grew from about 40 to 70 percent. This tremendous  expansion  was mainly due to
- ttwo  factors.  The first consisted  of improved medical  and sanitation  conditions in the cities,
which led to high birth and low deati rates.  The second, most important,  factor was migration
from rural areas.  Table 2 presents some demographic  indicators in Latin America.  In
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which were already highly urbanized  countries  by 1950, urban
population  grew at a-pace similar to that of developed  countries  and reached more than 85% of
total population  by 1990.  In other countries the process of urbanization  occurred notably
quickly: Brazil, Colombia,  Mexico, and Peru almost doubled  their respective  shares of urban
population  in 40 years.  Only in El Salvador and Guatemala,  urbanization  was slow during this
period (Portes and Schauffler  (1993)).
Rural-urban  migration  occurred  because living standards,  employment  opportunities,  and
general economic  conditions  improved steadily  in the cities relative to the countryside. The last
column of Table 2 reports the average  of the ratio of capital investment  to GDP for the period
1950 to 1985. For Latin America as a whole, it was 17.4%.  By far, most of this investnent
-~~~~~~~4was allocated  in the cities, thus creating  jobs and better income opportunities  in this areas.
Interestingly,  the lowest investment  rates in the region are found in El Salvador  and Guatemala,
where urbanizadon  was also sluggish.
Rural emigration  was induced  not only by capital formation  in the cities but also by
government  policies  that clearly  favored  urban over rural areas.  Early in the post-Second  World
War period, the development  strategy  advocated  by economists  and followed  by policy  makers
consisted  of rapid urban industrialization.  Urban-bias  policies  were gradually  implemented  to
pull or push rural inhabitants  to the cities to supply labor to the growing  industrial  sector. The
UN Economic  Commission  for Latin America  (ECLA)  promoted  thq model  of import  substitution
industrialization,  which advocated,  together  with high tariff protection  and heavy state
investment,  domestic  terms of trade that favored  industry  over agriculture  (Portes and Schauffler,
p. 34).  Latin American  governments  embarked  on numerous  public  projects;  in the cities,
including  the construction  and furnishing  of schools  and health faciiiies and the provision of
electricity, water, and other utilities.  F  rthermore,  roads and other means of tansportation were
improved  or constructed  to facilite  rural emigration  to the cities (Williamson  (1988)).
The disruption  of international  trade by World War I, the Great Depression,  and World
War II created  dissatisfacdon  with Laissez-faire  economic  policy in Latin America. Populism
and its associated  movements  responded  to this discontent  with strong  state intervention  in the
economy. Several  populists  movements  and leaders  were formed in the Inter-War  period, among
them, Haya de la Torre and the American Popular Revolutionary Allianice  (APRA) in Peru in the
1920's, and the Chilean  Socialist  Party in the 1930's; and in the 1940's, Juan Domingo  Per6n
and the Peronist  Party in Argentina, Jorge Eliecer Gaitin in Colombia,  and R6mulo  Betancourt
and Democratic  Action  in Venezuela. These leaders, their foilowers,  andlor their ideas atained
-5-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~power  in their respective  countries  at several  points in the "heyday"  of populism  from the 1930's
to the 1960's and less strongly  in the 1970's and 1980's  (Drake 1991).1 Table 3 presents  some
populists  episodes  in Latin America  during this period.
Populist  policies  sought  to control the economy  by means of direc. intervention  or
regulations. Prominent  among  the latter were labor  regulations. Cardoso and Hehwege  call
minimum  wage policies "the redistributive  centerpiece  of populism"  (p. 68).  Rather  extensive
labor legislati6n  codes were enacted  to purportedly  further  workers' welfare. These  regulations,
by effectively  raising labor compensation  above its market-dictated  level, diminish  the incentives
for the industrial  sector to provide  work to the growing  numbers  of city inhabitants. Cardoso
and Helwege  conclude  that "As the cornerstone  of populist  redistribution,  minimum-wage
increases  promoted  the welfare of relatively  small groups  at the expense  of larger groups"  (p.
62).  As result of the state-induced  excess labor supply  in the cities, an informal  sector, which
evaded  labor regulations,  rose to give work to the masses of people for whom unemployment  was
not a viable option: "...  informality  represents  the irruption  of  'real' market  forces in an
economy  straijacketed by mercantilist  regulation." 2
The ILO's Regional  Employment  Program  for Latin  America and the Caribbean  (whose
Spanish  acronym  is PREALC)  provides  estimates  of the urban informal  labor force for virtually
every country  in Latin America. Given  that most informal  activities,  per se, are not recorded  in
official  statistics,  measuring  informal  production  and labor force is very difficult  Table 4
presents  PREALC's estimates  for 14 Lafin American  countries  for the years 1960, 1970, 1980,
'One exception  to the waning of populism  from the 1970's is the Alan Garcia administration  in
Peru from 1985 to 1990, which almost  -brought  the country  to an economic  and political  collapse.
2Portes  and Schauffler,  p. 40, paraphrasing  Hemando  de Soto's view of informality  in his book
The Other Path.
-6-and 1989. PREALC's estimation  methodology  presents  serious shortcomings  and inconsistencies,
the most important  of which is the exclusion  of wage workers from early estimates. 3 For what
is worth, Table 4 reveals a significant  constancy  of the proportion  of urban informal  workers-
over the last 3 decades,  despite the tremendous  changes, concerning  industrialization  and
demographic  transformation,  experienced  in Latin America.
The post-Secoiid  World War Latin American  experience  with informnal  economies
motivates  this study.  Its pupose  is to integrate  and understand  the relations  between the most
important  features of the informal  experience,  namely, strong labor regulations, capital market
imperfections,  capital formation,  and rural-urban  migration. We want to understand the effects
of labor regulations  and informal  capital market imperfections  on income inequality, proxied  in
the model  by the dispersion  of urban wages, and the speed of industrialization,  proxied  by both
capital accumulation  and urbanization.
III.  THE MODEL
A.  THE ISOLATED URBAN ECONOMY
The urban economy  is competitive  and decentralized,  witi firms hiring production factrs
from their owners.  All firms produce-one  good (Y), which can be equivalently  used for
consumption  or investnent.  Firns  share a basic production  technology,  which has the
3PREALC's estimaon  strategy consists of  identifying informal employment with  entire
occupational  categories available from national censuses and household survwys.  PREALC his
consistently  classified  the self-enployed  -excluding  professionals  and technicians-  and  remunerated
family  workers  as informal  workers. Only in early estimates,  domestic  servants  were also included.
In recent  estimates  (1989), owners  and salaried  workers of "small  entlerprises"  (whose  size definiton
change!  from country  to country) have been classified  as informal  workers.  The exclusion  of wage
workern;  in early classifications  introduced  a strong downward  bias in the esfimates.
-.  -7-neoclassical  characteristics  (namely,  constant returns to scale, decreasing  returns to each factor,
and the Inada conditions)  and the property that production  factors are complementary  to each
other.  For simplicity  we assume that the production  function is Cobb-Douglas  and that capital
(K) and labor (L) are the only factors of production. Output production  is then given by
Y = AK-UL,  Ocacl  (1)
Labor-market  regulations  are represented  by the imposition  of a minimum  legal wage
rate.  Firms that obey the minimum  wage legislation  belong  to the formal sector.  Firms that
ignore it belong to the informal  sector.  Fims  cannot belong  to both sectors at the same ime.
-The  illegal saus  of informal firms makes contractual  agreements  more difficult and
costy,  especially  in capital and financial  markets. Because of additional  monitoring  and
transaction  costs, informal  firms face a higher cost of capital  than their formal counterparts. We
modelt  dse  (per-unit)  additional  capital costs as proportional  to the market-determined  net rental
rate of capitl.  Capital owners receive  the same nete rentl  rare from either sector and, thus, are
indifferent  betwe  the two.
Formal-and Informal Sectors in an Isolated Urban Economy
At a point in time, the aggregate  levels of labor and capital in urban areas are given.
This is so because in the case of an isolated  urban economy  both labor and capinl grow
gradually. The static solution  consists of the market allocation  of given urban aggregate  labor
and capital-across  the formal and informal sectors.
4Clearly,  net of monitoring and tansaction  costs.
-8-Profits for formal  firm i are given by
Il,;  = A Kg, L;4 - WLF  - RK,  (2)
where W is the minimum  legal wage rate, and R is the market-determined  net capital  rental
rate 5.
Profits for informal  firm  j are given by
I,j  = AK4'J-"LZ;  - WLJ  - CRK,J  (3)
where  WI is the market-deternined  informal  wage, and the parameter  j,  p>  1, is the factor of
proportionality  due to transaction  and monitoring  costs. This parameter  measures  the degree of
inefficiency  in capital  allocation  to informal  firms.
Since the production  technology  is constant  returns to scale, the size of firms in the
economy  is indeterminate. Finns in each sector choose  the ratio of physical to human  capital  that
maximizes  their profits. There is one such ratio for all firms in the formal sector and another
one for all firms in the informal  sector. Because  of this, in what follows  we use subscripts  to
differentiate  firms across sectors but not within each sector.
We now characterize  the equilibrium  situations  for different levels  of the minimum  legal
wage (W), ceteris paribus.  There are three cases to be considered.  First, the minimum legal
wage is not binding  so that only the formal sector  exists.  Second,  the minimum  legal  wage is
binding but not "too large" (as explained  below) so that the formal and informal  sectors coexist  in
5We  normalize  the factor of proportionality  due to monitoring  and transaction  costs to 1 in the
formal  sector. Therefore, the capital  rental rate paid by formal  producers  is equal  to the net rental
rate received  by capital  owners.
-9-the economy. And third, the minimum  legal wage is so large that the economy  is completely
informal.
First case: The minimum  legal wage is not binding. In this case, the market  wage
with full employment  in the formal  sector is higher than the legal minimum. That is, since no
worker will accept a wage lower than  the market  wage, the whole  economy  is formal. Profit
maximization  by firms, the zero-profit  condition  under perfect competition,  and full-employment
equilitrium  determine  the market wage rate (Wp)  and the net capitl  rental rate (R):
WF =  MPLF  = Al(!)
(4)
R  = MPKI  = A(I-a)(i)
where, MPL) and MPKF  denote the marginal  products  of labor and capital,  respectively,  in the
formal  sector; and K/L is the urban aggregate  capital-labor  ratio.
Second  case: The minimum  legal wage is binding  but not "too  large." In this case
the minimum  legal wage is higher than the unregulated  market wage 6. That is,
W > WuA =  Aa(  (5)
However,  the minimum  wage is not so high as to force the whole economy  to be
infornal.  In this case, under full-employment  equilibrium,  the formal  and the informal  sectors
6The unregulated  market wage is the wage obtained in the absence of the minimum  wage
regulation.
-10-coexist  in the economy.
Profit maximization  by firms, the zero-profit  condition,  and full-employment  market
clearing dictate  the following  equilibrium  conditions. In the formal  sector,
MPLF  Aa()  =w
MPKF  =  A(1 -a)R  R  ,
And in the informal sector,
MPL=  A{m)  w  (8)
MPKj,  A(1-a)()  =(
The minimum  legal wage rate plays a pivotal  role in the deternination of the net capital
rental rate and the informal  wage rate because it fixes the capital-labor  ratio in die formaF-sector.
From (6),
KF =  *~(10)
LF  IAzJ
Equation  (10) shows  that KF/HF  depends  positively  on the minimum  wage (W) and negatively  on
*-11-the productivity  parameter (A).'
We can express the net capital rental rate as a function of the minimum  wage rate by
substituting  (10) into (7):
R=  A(1-a)lmwaf)  I_a wl'1
Clearly, the net capiml  rental rate is negatively  related to the minimum  wage.
Given that  the cost of capital in the informal sector is equal to a fuxed  proportion  of that
in the formal sector, the ratio K 1/Ll is a fraction of the ratio KF/LF.  Dividing (9) by (7),
K/L  5_  ()
K,ILF
Then,
K,  KF  (13)
LI  L,
7Given that the minimum  wage is binding, the inequality in equation (5) applies.  Using the
expression  for KF/LF  in equation  (10) together  with the inequality  in (5), we find
K  KF
L  LF
-12-The informal  sector is less capital intensive  than the formal sector' because the former faces a
higher cost of capital.'  Clearly, the relative informal  capital intensity  varies inversely  with the
parameter t.
Since K,/L 1 is determined  by KF/LF,  we can express tie  informal  wage rate as a funcdon
of the minimum  wage rate.  Substituting  (12) and (10) into (8),
W  =  yt'W  (14)
Clearly, the informal wage is lower an  the legal minimum. This, of course, is consistent  with
the minimum  wage being binding. The smailer wage in the informal sector is due to the sector's
lower capital intensity.  The informal  wage increases  with the legal minimum  legal at a rate
lower than one.
Full employment  of production  factors allows us to determnine  the actual quantities  of
formal and informal Labor  and capital.  Using the definition  of -y as the ratio of capital intensities
in the two sectors (equation (12)), we can write
K.
'Note that lower capital intensity  in the informal sector is consistent  with KIL  C KFILF  under
conditions  of full employment  In fact, since full employment  means that K =  KF + K, and L  =
LF +  L1, it follows from KIL  c  KF/L  that
14  g  _ K,
L,  L  LF
'Had we considered  a more  general specification  for the additional  capital  costs fced by informal
firms, a larger minimum wage would have reinforced the higher capital intensity in the formal
sector.
-13-Given that K =  KF +  K 1 and L = LF + Li, and substituting  the expression  for KF/LF  from
equation  (10), the above expression  can be manipulated  to obtain
14  1  L  +  KAa)
1-y  -YAm
(IS)
1-Y l-y  1 -y (Am)  "
Equation  (15) provides expressions  for LF  and LI in terms of W, y, and the urban aggregate
levels of labor and capital.  An analogous  procedure  would allow us to find expressions  for KF
and K 1:
-F  1 
1-y  1-y\Acc
(16)
K-  -Y  Y ( WrL
,I1-y  - I.
Equation  (15) (or (16)) allows us  to  see how the coexistence  of both  sectors in the
economy  requires that, for given L and K, the legal minimum  wage be in between two  limiting
values. The lower limit W' is the value at which the minimum  wage is just binding. Then,
Aa)  (17)
Note, from equation  (15), that when W is equal to W',  LF  is equal to L (and KF is equal to K).
That is, at the lower limit W', the economy is still completely  formal.
-14-The upper limit W'  is the value at and above which no firm can afford to pay the legal
wage while paying the competitive  rental rate of capital.  In fact, when W is equal to W", LF is
equal to zero, and LI is equal to L (also KF  =  0,. K, =  K).  That is, at the upper limit Wm,  the
economy starts to be compktely informal. From equation  (15), we can determine  Wt:
W=  ()A  )L  (18)
Note that W" varies inversely  with -y.
Equations  (15) and (16) were developed  under the conditions  that create an equilibrium
where both formal and informal firms are present in the urban economy.  It is, therefore, not
surprising chat they make no sense when W is lower than W'  or higher dtan Wt.
Let us examine  how labor and capital in each sector respond to changes in the aggregate
levels, for a given minimum  legal we.
Suppose  that the miimum  legal wage is fixed at some level.  Also, suppose  th
aggregate  capital is constant.  Figure 1 graphs L  and L, as functions  of L (for given K, W, -y)
and K (for given L, W-, y).  Let us focus on changes in urban aggregate  labor (L).  For small
enough values of L, the minimum  legal wage is not binding, and, therefore, L  is equal to L;
that is, all labor and capital are formal.  As L increases  beyond the threshold  point L',  L 1 F
decreases, and therefore L 1 rises faster dtan L.  This continues  until L is so large (relative to K,
of course) that there is no longer an equilibrium  in which L$  can be positive (from  point L" on),
and the whole economy  is informal.
Consider only the region where-both sectors coexist  so that equation  (15) applies.  Given
that the wage and rental rates are fixedby the minimum  legal wage, when L or K change, the
economy acommodates by adjusting  the relative sizes of the two sectrs.  From (16), we can
--15-calculate the partial derivatives of LF  and L, with respect to L:
t --  - =  1 >  1  (19)
aL  I  81  1-y
Labor employed in the informal  sector increases  more than proportionately  to  the increase
in urban aggregate  labor, and, thus, formal labor decreases. This can be explained  as follows:
An increase in urban aggregate  labor makes the minimum  wage more restrictive, in the sense that
it becomes  further above the unregulated  wage.  This induces  an expansion  of the relative size of
the informal  sector.  Given that aggregate  capital is constant  and the capitSl-labor  ratio in the
informal sector must remain unchanged, such expansion  is attained  through a shift of capital fron
the formal to the informal sector. Therefore, since the formal capital-labor  ratio must also stay
unchanged,  formal labor decreases along with formal capital.
The effects of capital stock changes on the relative size-  of both sectors can be analyzed
analogously.
Third  case:- The minimum legal-  wage is so high that ail firms are informal.  If the
legal minimum  wage is too high (W >  W"), the equilibrium  tiat  allows formal and informal
finns to coexist breaks down, and the only market-clearing  solution  is for all fums to be
informal.
Profit maximizaton by firms, the zero-profit condition,  and full employment  equilibrium
determine  the market wage rate (W) and the net capital rental rate (R):-
-16-W4 =  MPL 1 =Am  A  )
(20)
R  = !MPK  -A(1  -a)(￿i
The informal wage is now the same as that when the economy is completely formal.  This
is so because now the informal wage is also dictated by the relative scarcities of urban aggregate
capital and labor.  However,  the net rental rate of capital is now smaller because the additional
transaction and monitoring costs decrease tie  value of capital.
Comparative  Statics
We now present a graphical exposition of the wage and net capital rental rates, as well as
relative' 0 sector employment, in the three cases analyzed above.  In the graphs,  the subscript-
"UNR  is used to denote the unregulated wage and capital rental rates, that is, te  competitive
rates that will occur in the absence of a minimum legal wage.
Figure 2 shows the wage and net capital rental rates, as well as relative labor
employment, as functions of the miniimum legal wage,  holding 7y  and KIL constaft.t
Figure 3 allows the informal capital allocation efficiency parameter  y to vary, holding
"'Throughout  this  paper,  "relative"  employment  refers  to  employment  relative  to  total
employment in the urban economy.  For instance, relative informal labor is L/L.
11 Figure  2  shows  the  informal  wage  not jumping  when  the  economy  becomes  completely.
informal.  That WI is continuous at W" can be proven by substituting W'  (equation (18)) into the
*formula for WI when the two sectors coexist (equation (14)).  By doing that, we obtain the same
value for W 1 as when the whole economy is informal (equation (20))..
By the same token,  Figure 2 shows the net capital rental rate not jumping either when the
economy moves  from  complete  formality  or  when  it  becomes  completely  informal.  Similar-
arguments as  for WI can be made to prove  that R  is continuous at both.W'  and W".  Figure  3
implies a similar analysis
-17-KIL constant and W at a given binding level.  Note that when the additional  capital costs to
informal  producers are sufficiently  low (that is, -y  >y"),  the whole economy is informal.
Figure 4 allows the aggregate  capital-labor  ratio to vary, holding  y and W constant.
Conldusions  and Policy implications (applied  mainly to the niixed economy  case)
1.  The formal sector is more capital intensive  than the aggregate  economy, which in turn is
more capital intensive  than the informal  sector.
2.  When the minimum  wage is increased because, for instance,  government  pursues populist
policies  to benefit the core of formal unions,
a. Although  the informal wage increases, the gap between  formal and informal  wages widens.
b. The net capital rental rate decreases.
c. The informal sector expands and the formal sector shrinks.
3.  When the additional  capital costs to informal  producers diminish  because, for instance,  capital
subsidies  are-  provided to informal firms or the informal sector develops a control and
enforcement  system that cuts down their transaction  and monitoring  costs,
a. The informal-  wage rises, and the gap between formal and infornal wages narrows.
b. The informal capital rental rate decreases, approaching  the net capial rental rate obtained
when no minimum  legal wage is imposed.
c. The informal sector expands and the formal sector shrinks.
4.  As aggregate  capital decreases relative to labor because,  for instance, there is capital flight or
labor immigration,
a. The relative size of the informal  sector rises.  If only one aggregate  factor changes, we can
predict the absolute size of either sector.  For instance,  when labor imniigration  occurs and the
-18-capital stock remains constant, the absolute size of the informal sector rises whereas the absolute
size of die formal sector shrinks.
b.  The wage and rental rates remain unchanged,  not reflecting  the relative scarcities  of
production factors.
B.  THE URBAN ECONOMY IN THE PRESENCE OF A RURAL SECTOR
Rural-Urban  Migration Equirbrium
Assume  that in rural areas the production  technology  does not require capital and is linear
in labor (Lewis  (1954)). That is,
Y=  BLR  . (21)
In the absence of government intervention,  the rural wage (WR)  is equal to the productivity
parameter B.
There are no migration  costs and there is complete  turnover of workers in the formal and
frlormal sectors.  '2 Therefore, all workers face the same migration  decision, which considers
only current wage opportunities  in urban and rural areas.  The migration  equilibrium  condition
we use resembles  that introduced  by Harris and Todaro (1970).  Assume  that workers are risk
12We  relax the assumption  of complete  job -tnover  in the formal sector in Appendix A.  We
show that allowing  for partial job turnover does  -not change the qualitative  results presented in the
txt.  Also, we show that the more accessible  the formal sector to all workers, the higher the urban
labor force and the relative size of the informal sector.
-19-neutral.' 3 Then, the migration  equilibrium  condition  is given by
WE.- Alf  WR  (22)
where, M represents the per-period wage adjustment  due to different cost of living in the cities;
and WE is the urban expected  wage.  The assumption  of complete  job turnover in the cities
implies  that WE is equal to a weighted average  of fonnal and informal  wages with the weights
given, respectively,  by the relative size of the each sector.
Given that we allow the possibility of inmmediate  labor relocation  across the two areas, the
equilibrium  condition in (22) must hold at all times.' 4
Urban Formal and Informal  Sectors with Ample Supplies of Labor from Rural Areas
When in urban areas a binding, but not "too large," minimum  legal wage is imposed,
both formal and informal  sectors arise in the economy.' 5 The analysis  presented in the previous
section  for the mixed  economy  case applies, under the conditions  outlined  below, in the presence
of a rural sector.  In partcular, equations (6) to (16), which determine  the informal  wage and
capital rental rates and the relative size of each sector,  -still hold true.
"3Te  Assumption of risk  neutrality is  -not  necessary for the analysis but is  algebraically
convenient  for the purpose of comparative  statics.  We are not interested in describing the effects
of risk aversion on migration  decisions.
1 4In Harris and Todaro (1970), migration  is a disequilibrium  phenomenon. It occurs when the
expected  urban wage is higher than the rural wage.  Implied  in their analysis  are migration  costs that
preclude  the possibility  of immediate  relocation  of labor from rural to urban areas (infinite  migration
rate).  Therefore, in their model, the migration  equilibrium  condition is achieved only in the long
run:
I"The  range of minimum  legal  wages that  produce  the coexistence  of both sectors is given below.As explained  shortly, in the presence  of a rural sector with ample supplies of labor, the
level of the labor force in the cities is no longer autonomously  given;  it is in fact a function  of
tle capital stock,  ihe  minimum  wage, the additional  capital  costs to informal  producers, and the
adjusted  rural wage.  Therefore, equation  (15), which determines the size of formal and informal
sectors, must be rewritten to account.for  the dependence  of the urban labor force on those other
variables.
Using equations (14) and (15.)t  we find that the average  wage in urban areas is a linear
function  of the urban aggregate  capital-labor  ratio:
WA  LFW+  L,W
AL  L
"A  ~  ~~  i-  1  -g+tt
'  -Y  W +  _1_  _  )1  WI-,  K  (23)
17Y.'  1-T  L
ao-  =  (W,y) + al(Wy)  ,
Substituting  the expression for the urban average  wage into the midgraton  equilibiium  condition
(equation  (22)), we find
L  -~~K. -L  _lVtMa,(W,y) 
V-WR+M  W,Zf))  ~~~~~~~(24)
g(W,'-M,W,y)  K
Equation  (24) detrmines the size of the urban labor force that is consistent  with
migration  equilibrium. The size of urban aggregate labor is increasing  in the capital stock and
-21-the efficiency  of informal capital allocation  (-y),  and decreasing  in the adjusted rural wage
(W 1t+M).  Furthermore, the size of the urban labor force when the whole economy  is formal.is
the same as when the economy is completely  informal  (L(W  <W')  =  L(W  W")).  This is so
because in both cases the urban wage equals the adjusted rural wage (as explained  below).  It can
also be shawn that the size of urban aggregate  labor in those two cases is always greater than
when the economy  is partially informal.' 6
Substituting  equation (24) into (15) we find the relative size of fornal and informal labor
employment  in the presence of a rural sector:
F=  (1)(WRF M X
(25)
L  l-  J  - - W:
As expected,  the relative size of the informal  sector increases  with the minimum  legal wage (W)
and the efficiency  of informal capital allocation  (y), and.  decreases  with the adjusted  rural wage
(WR+M). The effects of changes in W, 'y, and WR+M.  on the absolute size of formal and
informal  sectors go in the same direction as the effects on their respective relative sizes.  This is
not obvious,  as it was in the case of an isolated  urban  economy, because of the additional effects
of those parameters  on the urban labor force.
In order for the urban economy  to present both formal and informal sectors, the minimum
legal wage must be between the values W' and Wn.  The lower limit W' is the value at which the
161n  fact, the size of the urban labor force, ceteris  paribus, first decreases, reaches a minimnm,
and then increases  with W.
-22-minimum  wage is just binding  (Lp/L  I  in equation  (25)):
W  W+  M  (26)
Note that W' is the unregulated  urban wage in the presence  of surplus labor from rural areas.
The upper limit W'  is the value at which the economy  just becomes  completely  informal
(LF/L =  0 in equation (25)):
=  + M)  (27)
Note that when W =  W", the informal  wage is equal to the adjusted  rural wage (WI - WR+M),
which, again, is the unregulated  urban wage in the presence  of surplus labor.
The graphical  presentation  used in the case of an isolated  urban economy  can also be
applied here.  The only change is that the unregulated  rates, as well as the lower and upper limits
W' and W", are now given in terms of the adjusted  rural wage (WR+M).
Condusions and Policy Implications  (applied  mainly to the mixed-economy  case)
1. Conclusions 1, 2, and 3 of the isolated-urban-economy  case also apply here.
2. As aggregate  capital decreases  because, for instance,  there is international  capital flight or
capital destruction,
a. The absolute  size of the urban labor force, as well as both formal and informal  labor
employment,  decreases.
b. The respective  relative sizes of formal and informal  labor remain the same.
3.  The size of the urban labor force in the cities at any point in time is no longer autonomous
-23-but varies directdy  with the capital stock and the  efficiency  of Informal  capital allocation,  and
inversely  with the adjusted rural wage.  Also, the size of the urban labor force in the  absence of
minimum  wage regulations  is greater than when they are imposed.
4.  As the adjusted.rural wage (WR+M)  decreases because, for instance,  government  follows an
urban-bias  policy through  worsening the rural-urban terms of trade or improving  public
infrastructure  and services in the cities,
a. The urban labor force rises.
b. The relative and absolute size of the informal  sector expands.
C.  DYNAMIC BEIHAVIOR  OF THE ECONOMY:  CAPITAL ACCUMULATION  AND
RURAL-URfBAN  MIGRATION
The aggregate labor force and capitl  stock in urban areas change through time, thus
affecting  the size of the fonnal and informal  sectors.  The -labor  force in the cities expands by
means of a rural-urban  process of migration, and the capital stock grows according to a program
of savings and investnent
Capital  Acculatiou
We assume that there are two different groups of individuals: Workers and capitalists.
Workers supply labor inelastically  and do not save or borrow. 17 Capitalists  do not work but
' 7hi reality this assumption  means that workers' desired level of current consumption  is higher
than their wage.  However, because of financial market imperfections,  they are unable to obtain
loans against their future higher income. Therefore, workers are constrained  to consume only all
their current wage.  As we indicate  iater, given that we are abstrating from technological  progress,
workers' wage converge  to a finite value.  If such value is below their desired income  and they are
-24-rent out their capital to firms, and they save according to an optimal intertemporal program.
These assumptions amount to a version of Kaldor's model of distribution (Kaldor (1956), Alesina
and Rodrik (1991)).
Normalize the size of the group of capital owners to 1. Capitalists solve the following
dynamic program:
Max fe  fln(CQ )dt  (28)
0
subject to
K(t)  = R(t)  K(O  - C(t)  t9
where C represents instantaneous consumption by capitalists and p is the subjective rate of time
preference.  The capital depreciation rate is assumed to be zero.  The assumption  that the
instantaneous utility function is logarithmic proves to be very convenient, as we show shortly.
Maxinization of discounted intertemporal utility in (28) subject to the instantaneous
budget constraint in (30) implies the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
C(t)  = R(t)  - p  (30)
-IAR.)dv  .(31)
lim K(t)e  '  =3O
unable to use financialr  markets, workers will never save or b  -xrow.
-25-Equation  (30), the Euler equadon,  gives  consumption  growth as a function  of the net
capital  rental  rate.  Equation  (31), the transversality  condition,  ensures  that not Htoo  much"  is
saved.
The  budget  constraint,  the Euler equation,  and the  transversality  condition  allow  us to
solve  for the level of consumption  as a function  of the capital  stock:
C(t)  = p K(i)  (32)
The propensity  to consume  out of capital  is equal  to p, a constanL" Using  the Euler equation,
we obtain
Kt)  =  C(t) = R.t)-p  (33)
K(t)  CQt)
From previous  sections  we know that as long as the urban economy  is mixed
(formal/informal),  the capital  rental  rate is detennined  by the minimum  legal wage  (W), as in
equation  (11). Given  that we keep W fixed  throughout  this analysis,  the capital  rental  rate is also
18 Had we used a general constant relative  risk aversion  (CRRA)  utility function,  the level of
consumption  would  also have been a linear  function  of the capital  stock. However,  the propensity
to  consume  out of capital  would not, in general,  have been  a constant  but a function  of the entire
future  path  of capital  rental  rates. This would  have  complicated  the analysis  since  the path  of rental
rates depends on whether and when the future economy is partially or completely formal, which in
tum depends-on  the  rate of capital  accumulation.  We conjecture  that if the  coefficient  of relative  risk
aversion  (0) is lower  than 1, there exists  a unique.equilibrium  path for the capital  stock. However,
if 0> 1, the trajectory  of the capital  stock  will present  multiple  equilibria  because  of the feedback
effect of the rate of migration  on the rate of capital  accumulation. This feedback  effect  works as
foflows: When  a higher  rate of migration  occurs,  rural  areas are depopulated  faster. After  the rural
sector is completely  depopulated,  the economy  gradually  becomes  more formal.  In a completely
formal economy  with capital accumulation,  the rental rate gradually decreases.  When 0>1,  a
lowering  of the path  of future rental  rates leads  to higher  savings  and capital  accumulaion. This in
tum produces  a higher rate of migration,  and the feedback  chain s  again.
-26-fLxed  for as long as the economy  is partially informal. Let's call this fixed level of the capital
rental rate Ro.  a
We assume that capiitlists are sufficiently "patient'  so that R  - p  >  0.  Therefdre,  the
economy's capital stock  will grow at a constant rate for as long as the economy  is partally
infonnal.
Rural-Urban lMiration  as the Result of Capital Accumulation  and a Gradually Implemented
Urban-Bias Policy
The migration  equilibrium  condition  in (24) establishes  a relationship  betwee  capitl
acumulation and  ural-urban  migration. Taldng logs and then time derivatives  in (24), we find
L.  dlng(WOt+M,W,y)  j
L  dt  K
(34)
K
The labor force in the cities  will grow faster than aggregate  capital  for as long as the function
g(.) increases  over time: +(t) >  02'
The implementafion  of urban-bias  policies  can be represented  -in our model  by an
exogenously-induced  inrease  in the finction g(.), through  a decrease  of the rural wage (Wi) and
the cost-of-iving adjustment  paramt  (M).
"9In  the text, we assunme  that the urban labor force grows only through immigration. If urban
population grows autonomously  (that is,  through births and deaths) at the rate n,,  the rate of
ilmmigration  m will be given by
*  ±
K
There will be rural-urban  migration  as long as n. is not too large.
-27-Therefore,  as long as the urban-bias  policies  are strengthened,  the labor  force in the cities
grows  faster than the capiial  stock.
Urban  policies  are eventally curved  and made stable. When  the rural wage and the cost-
of-living  adjustment  remain stable,  the model  predicts  that the urban labor  force grows at the
same rate as the capital  stock.
Dynamic  Behavior or  the Economy
We-  can now integrate  the results  from the previous  two sections  with those from capital
accumulation  to characterize ihe  dynamic  behavior  of the economy. We can describe three
phases in trms  of the relative  size of the informal  economy.
First Phase:  Expansion of the Relative (and Absolute)  Size  of the Informal Sector.
During  this phase, urban-bias  policies  are gradually  implemented:  0(t) >  0.  Since capital  grows
at a constant  rate, the urban  labor growdt  is given, from equation  (34), by
L(t)  3a -)  =  (1|()  + Ro -P(3a
Clearly,  the urban labor  force grows  faster  an the capital  stock. This decrease  of the urban
aggregate  capital-labor  ratio-produces,  from equation  (15) (or (25)), an expansion  of the informal
labor  force relative to the urban aggregate. 20
Urban-bias  policies  are curved  before the rral  sector is completely  depopulated. When
both the rural wage and the cost-of-living  adjustment  are no longer decreased  but kept stable,  the
economy  enters its second  phase.
2DWe  assume,  however, that  the economy  remains  mixed. This is true if the adjusted  rural wage
is not reduced  too much (see equation  (27)).
-28-Second Phase:  Stability of the Relative Size of the Informal Sector.  When the
adjusted rural wage is stable, the urban labor force grows at the same rate as the capital stock:
A*  =  P-  (34b)
As long as there are workers left in the rural sector, the urban capital-labor ratio remains
constant in the face of capital accumulation.  From equation (15) (or (25)), this implies that the
relative size of the informal sector remains unchanged.
If autonomous populadon growth in rural areas is not very large, and given that the flow
of migrants to the cities is rising2' in this second phase, eventually, rural areas will be
completely depopulated'.  V/hen tis  happens the economy enters its -third  phase.  Note that the
greater the pool of rural workers, the larger the phase in which the relative size of the informal
sector is stable.
Third Phase:  Contration  of the Relative (and Absolute) Size of the Informual  Sector
and the Emergence of a Purely Formal Economy.  At the start of this phase the rural sectr
has disappeared;  and therefore migration and, thus, urban labor-force expansion have come to a
halt.  Then, the analysis of the isolated urban economy (Section III.A) applies to this phase.
During the early periods, the formal and informal sectors coexist.  The capital stock
accumulates at the constant rate R. - p;  therefore, the aggregate capital-labor ratio steadily
increases.  From equation (15), this implies that the relative (and absolute) size of the informal
"1Clearly, the flow of migrants is given by
L(t) = (Ra-p)L(t)
This is due, among other things, to the assumed rural liner  technology.  More realistically,
if the rural wage increases fast enough as workers migrate to the cities, the rural sector will never
be completely depopulated.
-29-sector shrinks  until it disappears  completely  when  the ninimum  legal wage is just binding. 23
When the economy  is completely  formal,  capital  accumulation  produces  a decrease  of the
capital  rental  rate, reflecting  the relative  scarcity  of labor.  Capital  growth  slows  down  as the
rental  rate approaches  the subjective  rate of time  preference  (p).  Given  that we have  abstracted
from exogenous  technological  progress  and autonomous  population  growth, the steady  state  is
characterized  by zero  economic  growth.
Figure 5 graphs  various quantities  and rates during the three phases  of the economy's
dynamic  behavior.
Conclusions  and Poliey  Implications.
1.  Urban-bias  policies  accelerate  the process  of rural-urban  migration  at the cost of increasing
the relative  (and absolute)  size of the informal  sectDr  and, therefore,  lengthening  the time the
purely-urban  economy  takes to become  completely  formal. (See Appendix  B for a detailed
description  of the length  of transition  to complete  formality.)
2.  In the absence  of urban-bias  policies  and for given  minimum  legal wage  and efficiency  of
informal  capital  allocation,  the relative  size of the informal  sector remains  constant  in the face  of
'We  can show  that at the time the flow of migrants  stops, the minimum  wage is binding  in the
sense  that it is greater than  the unregulated  wage  for the isolated  urban economy. This unregulated
wage  is given  by
- A  (  As(  WR+M  a(W$'
Given  that  the minimum  wage  was binding  in the  presence  of a rural sector, we know  that  W >  WR
+  M.  Using  this inequality,  as well as the expressions  for a0 and a, from (23), we find that
-a1 *Wu  <  A  {?)  =-W
-30capital  accumulation. This is so because the urban labor force grows (through immigration)  at
the same rate as capital does to maintain  the expected  equality  of wages  across urban and rural
areas.
3.  When the minimum  legal wage is increased, the capital  growth rate falls, inducing  a decrease
in the growth rate of the urban labor force.  A rise in the minimum  legal wage delays the time to
complete  the rural-urban  migration  process and slows down the transition  to a purely formal
economy.
4.  When the efficiency  of informal  capital allocation  improves  (-y  increases), the process of
rural-urban  migration  is completed  faster but at the cost of delaying  the next stage, in which the
formal  economy  expands. This is so because  an improvement  of informal  capital allocatioA
induces informality. Nevertheless,  as concluded  in previous  sections, a rise in -y brings the
informal  wage closer to the formal one.
IV.  EXTENSIONS FOR FUTURE  RESEARCH
We believe  that the theoretical  analysis  in this paper should  be extended  along the
-following,  two directons.  The first one is to examine  the welfare implications  of informal
economies  and, therefore, the welfare effects of our various  policy  parameters. This could be
done using the approach  oudined  by Sen (1974), which considers  not only the average level'of
income  but also a measure of inequality. The second  extension  is to allow for endogenous
determination  of the minimum  legal wage through the formation  of coalidons. If the minimum
legal wage is updated to satisfy some  collective  purpose, there exists  the possibility  of partial'
economic  informality  in the long run.
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-33-Table 1 Rough  Estimates  of the Informal  Sector  Labor  Force  in Urban  Areas
|Country Category  GDP per Capita  No. of Countries  Informal Sector (%)
(1985 PPPs) US$
|Low Income  Under I,DOO  4  51
Mid. Range  (I)  1,000-1,500  5  47
Mid. Range  (II)  1,500-2,000  2  43
Mid Range  (III)  2,000-3,000  4  35
High Income  3,000 and above  4  31
Note: Low Income  Countries: Nigeria, Bangladesh,  India, Cote  d'Ivoire.
Mid. Range  (1)  Countries: Pakistan,  Bolivia,  Indonesia,  Philippines,  Morocco.
Mid. Range  (II) Countries: Sri Lanka,  Thailand.
Mid. Range  (III) Countries: Peru, Colombia,  Turkey, Costa  Rica.
High Income  Countries: Korea, Brazil, Chile,  Venezuela.
Source: Turmham  (1993),  p. 147. Estimates  based  on Labor  Force-Survey  data: Informal
sector  employment  is proxied  by the sum of the self-employed  -except  professionals  and
technicians-,  their unpaid  family  workers, and wage  workers  in "small"  enterprises. Real
GDP per capita, from Summers  and Heston  (1988).
-34-Table 2  Demographic Indicators and Investment Rates in Latin America
Average Annual Growth Rate from  Urban  Average Ratio
1950  to 1990 of the  Population as  of Investmentb
Country  TtlPercentage of  to GDP from
Country  Total Population  Urban  Fthe  Total in  1950 to 1985
Population  1950 and 1990
Argentina  1.5  2.3  66.1 -86.2  25.1
Bolivia  2.4  3.2  38.2 - 51.4  12.9
Brazil  2.6  4.4  36.4 - 76.9  24.4
Chile  1.9  2.9  60.2 - 85.6  29.7
Colombia  2.6  4.1  37.9 - 70.3  18.8
Costa Rica  3.2  4.0  33.9 -53.6.  14.2
Ecuador  2.9  4.5  29.2 - 56.9  24.1
El Salvador  -2.5  3.0  36.8 - 44.4  7.3
Guatemala  2.9  3.2  33.0 - 42.0  8.8
Mexico  2.9  4.2  43.5 - 72.6  . 18.8
Panamna  2.7  3.5  37.4  - 54.8  23.0
Peru  2.6  4.3  35.4 -.70.2  13.2
Uruguay  0.8  1.0  78.5 - 85.5  12.1
Venezuela  3.4  4.8  53.0 - 90.5  1L7
Latin America  2.5  3.9  41.8 - 71.5  17.4
1950-60  2.8  4.5  49.3'
1960-70  2.7  4.2  57.3'
1970480  2.6  3.7  65.0R
1980-90  2.1,  3.1i  71.5k  -
'Figures are for the year ending the decade.  bPublic plus private investment.
Sources:  For population data, ECLA (1981), ECLAC (1991), United Nations (1991a,
1991b).  For investment data, Summers and Heston (1988).
-35-Table 3  Populist Episodes in Eight Latin Ameican Countries
High Populist  Counwies  Low Populist  Countries
Argentina  Colombia
Per6n (1946-55)  Betancur  (1982-86)
Per6n.(1973-76)
Brazil  Mexico




Ibiiez (1952-58)  P6rez  (1974-78)
Allende  (1970-73)
Peru  Uruguay
Belaunde  (1963-68)  Batle (1954-58)
Velasco  (1968-75)
Garcia (1985-90)
Source: Kaufman  and Stallings  (1991), p. 29.
-36-Table  4  Latin America: Rough  Estimates  of Urban  Informal  Employment  as a Percentage
of the Urban  Labor  Force, 1960-89
Country  1960  1970  1980  1989
Argentina  21.1  19.1  23.0  28.7
Bolivia  62.2  56.0  56.5  n.a.
Brazil  27.3  27.9  27.2  28.6
Chile  35.1  23.9  27.1  30.0
Colombia  39.0  31.4  34.4  27.3
Costa Rica  29.3  22.6  19.9  22.0
Ecuador  35.2  58.0  52.8  n.a.
El Salvador  42.6  39.5  39.9  n.a.
Guatemala  51.6  43.5  40.0  n.a.
Mexico  37.4  34.9  35.8  34.8
Panama  25.3  26.5  35.6  n.a.
Peru  46.9  41.0  40.5  39.0
Uruguay  18.6  20.7  23.1  19.0
Venezuela  32.3  31.4  20.8  23.3
Lain America  30.8  29.6  30.2  31.0
Note: PREALC  has consistently  classified  the self-employed  -excluding  professionals  and
technicians-  and their unremunerated  family  workers  as informal  workers. Domestic
servants  were similarly  so classified  in earlier estimates. Owners  and salaried  workers  in
"small"  enterprises  are classified  as informal  workers  only  -in he estimates  for the year
1989.
Source: Portes  and Schauffler  (1993),  p.42. Estimates  obtained  from various  publications
by ILO's Regional  Employment  Program  for Latin  America  and the Caribbean
(PREALC).
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m  J  ;  i  d  |  :+APPENDIX  A:  Partal  Job Turnover in the Formal Sector
We can relax.  the assumption  of complete  job turnover in the formal  sector in the
following  way: Suppose  that at any point in time the fraction  0 of formal  jobs is allocated  to
urban  workers searching  for employment  in the formal  sector.  If 0=1, there is complete  job
turnover, which.  is the case presented  in the text.  if 0 < 0 < 1, formal  workers have a better
chance  tc retain their higher-paying  jobs than the rest of the urban labor force.
Under  this new  job-allocation  arrangement,  the expected  urban wage for people  searching
employment  in the formal sector is given by
OLFW  L
r=  F  W  O+  7 W  (23')
- 3  +L,  (LF+L, 
Using the migration  equilibriuni  condition  (equation  (22)),.  we obtain  an expression  for the size of
the urban labor force at any point in time,
L  h(WR+M,.W,y,O)K  (24')
The effects  of the-capital  stock and the paramneters  on the urban labor force are the same
as those under complete  job turnover. In particular,.,  the urban labor force is linearly  increasing
in the capital  stock, increasing  in the efficiency  of  -informal  capital  allocation  (y), and decreasing
in the adjusted  rural wage (WR  +M).  It is also straightforward-  to show  that the size of the urban
labor force varies direcdy with th  fraction  0.  That is, as a greater fraction  of formal  jobs
become  open, more people migrate  to the cities im  search for a higher-paying  formal  job.  hi
equilibrium,  of course, the informal  sector eipands so as to equaize the-expect6d  urban wage  to
the adjusted  rural wage.
43 . .From the migration  equilibrium  condition,  we can also obtain  the relative size of each
sector as a function of 0 and the other parameters. As we said before, if 0=1,  there is complete
job wrnover and the expressions  for LF/L  and L,/L given in the text (equation  (25)) hold true.
Let us denote the relative size of formal and informal sectors when 8=I  as LFIL(1)  and L1/L(I),
respectively. After some manipulation,  we obtain.
LL
LF  L
L  ~~~L  (2J
e L()
L  , -(1) L  ~~L
L
As with complete  job turnover, the relative size of the infonnal sector increases  with the
minimum  legal wage (W) and the efficiency  of informal capital allocation  (y), and decreases with
the adjusted  rural wage (WR+M). Furthermore, under partial job turnover, the relative size of
the informal  sector varies directly  with the fracdon of formal  jobs open to those searching for
employment  in this sector (0).
44APPENDIX  B:  Length  of Transition  to Complete  Urbanization  and Formality
The urban labor force is given by,
cR-PY+fr$d
L(O = L(O)c  a  for  OstcT1
Rt)  = L(T7)ecEP)(t1t)  for  stc<  T2
L(t)  = L  for  T2 src.t
where L  is the constant labor force in the comutry  (rural plus urban). Clearly, T, is the time at
which urban-bias  policies level off, and T2 marks the time when rural populadon  disappears.
The stock  of capital is given by,
K)  = K(O)e RrP)t  for  Otc<T 3
J'(W.v)-p)du
K(t)  =K(Td e T for  T3 st 
where K(13) is such that
W=A  - (B3)
Clearly,  T3 is t  time at which the economy  becomes  completely  fonnal.
Urban-bias  polices (¢(v) > 0) diminish  T2 but do not affect T3,  which  depends  on the
initial level of the capital stock (which is given) and its rate of accumulaton.
45An increase  in the minimum  wage makes  T3 rise because  W both  decreases  R. and
increases  K(T 3).  If total labor force in die country is large enough,  T2 will also vary direcdy
with W:  We know that L(T 2)  =  L,  then, from (BI),
71
Q-p)T2  +f,Kvev  (B4)
L  =  L(O)e
therefore,
T2=  -1R[(Lf  O + Ro-P OL(O)]  (a5)
aw  (R4_p-2[  Iz(o)Jaw  L  M.
The partial derivative  of L(O)  with respect  to W could be positive  or negative; but if V: is large
enough,  which we assume, the sign of the expression  in brackets is negative. Then, T 2 varies
direcdy  with W.
An improvement  in the efficiency  of informal  capital  allocation  lowers  T2 because  it
rises the initial level of the urban labor force (L(O)). However,  it does not affect T3.
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